Rights, explanation, and risks by McCarthy, D
Title Rights, explanation, and risks
Author(s) McCarthy, D
Citation Ethics, 1997, v. 107 n. 2, p. 205-225
Issued Date 1997
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/179490
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
Rights, Explanation, and Risks
Author(s): David McCarthy
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Ethics, Vol. 107, No. 2 (Jan., 1997), pp. 205-225
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381946 .
Accessed: 03/02/2013 22:01
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
 .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 .
The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Ethics.
http://www.jstor.org 
This content downloaded  on Sun, 3 Feb 2013 22:01:52 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ARTICLES 
Rights, Explanation, and Risks* 
David McCarthy 
It is permissible to impose some risks of harm on another only if she 
consents. It is permissible to impose other risks of harm on her without 
her consent. At least in some cases, if you impose a risk of harm on 
her and she is harmed as a result, you are under a duty to compensate 
her. Sometimes it is permissible for you to harm someone to prevent 
her from imposing a risk of harm on you or someone else. And it is 
permissible for government to punish people for imposing certain 
kinds of risks. So much is clear. But can these and other facts about 
the morality of actions which impose risks of harm on others be accom- 
modated within a theory of rights? 
Many people have thought they cannot. The main claim of this 
article is that they can. But first, let us ask whether they should be 
accommodated in a theory of rights. For not every fact about permissi- 
bility is somehow a fact about rights. But permissibility, consent, com- 
pensation, self-defense, and punishment lie deeply within the morality 
of risk imposition, and these concepts are what rights are centrally 
about. Moreover, any plausible theory of rights will ascribe to us some- 
thing at least very much like the right that others not harm us, at least 
when harm is construed fairly narrowly to cover, largely, death and 
physical injury. It would be very surprising if facts about the morality 
of imposing risks of harms did not connect importantly with the moral- 
ity of harming, and that part of morality lies at the center of what 
rights are about. 
Despite this, many writers have been pessimistic about whether 
the morality of risk imposition can be accommodated in a plausible 
* I have many people to thank. Frank Arntzenius and Barbara Herman gave very 
useful advice on almost every draft of this article and were very encouraging throughout. 
I have also benefited from comments by Marshall Cohen, Judith Thomson, and Kadri 
Vihvelin. The editors and reviewers of Ethics, including, respectively, David Copp and 
Samantha Brennan, gave extensive comments on later versions. I wrote the final draft 
while being supported by a fellowship from the Greenwall Foundation, for which I 
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theory of rights.' It is easy to see why. Many of the activities we engage 
in daily impose minor risks of harm on others. It is clearly permissible 
for us to engage in many of these activities, but as soon as we start 
speaking of the rights of others not to have risks imposed upon them, 
our hands become tied, morally speaking, and we wind up with a 
morality which is far too restrictive. Or so the argument goes. 
If this pessimism were well founded, it would be a strong mark 
against the theory of rights and a disappointment to anyone who 
thinks that the theory of rights is an important part of moral theory. 
Not only would the theory of rights turn out to have less scope and 
explanatory power than we might have hoped, but it would also turn 
out to be unhelpful in just the kind of area in which it should be 
illuminating. 
I will be arguing, however, that facts about the morality of risk 
impositions can be accommodated by a plausible theory of rights. In 
particular, they can if we accept that we have the right that others not 
impose risks of harm on us. The obvious objections to this claim are not 
good objections, and the explanatory power we gain by accepting that 
we have that right is sufficient reason to believe we really do have it. 
I 
It will help if we ask what we want of a theory of rights. Disagreements 
over which rights we have are usually disagreements over what it is 
permissible for others to do. Someone who claims to have a certain 
right is usually claiming, roughly, that there are strong moral con- 
straints on others performing actions which would infringe that right. 
Someone who denies that she has that right is usually claiming, 
roughly, that those strong moral constraints do not exist. Let us call 
this a moral disagreement about rights. 
Suppose, fantastically, that two people agree on everything that 
it is permissible to do in every set of circumstances. Why might they 
still disagree over which rights people have? It is very plausible that 
the moral significance of an individual's having a right consists entirely 
in its effect on what people may or may not do, so what could be 
the basis for their disagreement? A natural answer is that they think 
1. For example, Robert Nozick says that risk impositions pose "serious" problems 
for any natural rights theory for which it is "difficult to see" a resolution; see Nozick, 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic, 1974), pp. 74-75. Peter Railton says that 
Lockean natural rights theories may be incapable of giving an adequate account of the 
morality of risk imposition; see Railton, "Locke, Stock, and Peril: Natural Property 
Rights, Pollution, and Risk," in To Breathe Freely, ed. Mary Gibson (Totowa, N.J.: Row- 
man & Allanheld, 1983), pp. 89-123. Dennis McKerlie argues that no adequate theory 
of rights can explain the relevant facts; see McKerlie, "Rights and Risk," Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 16 (1986): 239-51. 
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ascriptions of rights explain (some) facts about permissibility, and they 
disagree on which ascription best explains the facts about permissibility 
they agree on. Here, explanation consists in stating a theory of rights 
from which those facts can be derived which meets the various other 
criteria one normally wants of an explanatory theory. For example, 
the theory should reveal underlying structure and unity in the facts 
about permissibility, it should be simple and unified, and it should 
yield plausible conclusions about new cases. Let us call a disagreement 
in this sense a philosophical disagreement about what the best theory 
of rights is. 
There are several reasons for trying to construct a theory of 
rights.2 First, even if we are sure of the correctness of a particular set 
of propositions about the permissibility of actions, having a theory of 
rights which explains them well may improve our understanding of 
them by revealing various underlying contours. Second, we may be 
able to extrapolate from the theory. If it explains propositions we are 
sure about, we can view the theory as strongly supported by those 
propositions, and we can then use it to help us with those we are less 
sure about. Thus, the theory would provide a way of consistently 
extending our judgments about some cases to other cases. Third, if 
we can construct a theory which elegantly explains the great majority 
of our judgments about permissibility but is at variance with our judg- 
ments about a small number of cases, that may, for example, help us 
to see that those intuitions are the result of an undesirable kind of 
bias. Fourth, since internal coherence is something we generally want 
of our moral judgments, a theory of rights which reveals a coherent 
internal structure in a group of our judgments about permissibility 
would go some way toward a general justification of those judgments, 
if such a thing were needed. Of course, none of this is a guarantee 
that there is a theory of rights which can do all this; that is a matter 
for investigation. 
The mention of rights as a way of talking about disagreements 
about the permissibility of actions is somewhat distinct from the philo- 
sophical project of constructing a theory of rights, and it is the latter 
that concerns us. I shall be describing the theory of rights we have 
most reason to accept independent of risk imposition, and I will be 
citing facts about the permissibility of actions associated with risk impo- 
sitions. I will then argue that those facts can be well explained by that 
theory when we extend it in certain motivated ways. This will show 
that the pessimism many have felt about whether a theory of rights 
can adequately handle risk imposition is unwarranted. And, given the 
2. Compare T. M. Scanlon, "The Aims and Authority of Moral Theory," Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 12 (1992): 1-23. 
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prominence of being a good explanation among the criteria of what 
counts as a correct theory of rights, this will give us good reason to 
believe that the theory of rights, when extended in those ways, really 
is correct. 
II 
The most obvious way of trying to accommodate facts about risk impo- 
sitions in a theory of rights is to accept that we have the right that 
other people not impose risks of harm upon us. Call the claim that 
we have that right the Risk Thesis. The main claim of this article is 
that the Risk Thesis is correct. 
There would be theoretical advantages to accepting the Risk The- 
sis. For example, it would enable us to explain why some risk imposi- 
tions are impermissible, such as exposing someone to high levels of 
radiation for no particular reason or playing Russian roulette on her. 
But the Risk Thesis looks straightforwardly false.3 It makes far 
too many risk impositions impermissible and gives us a morality of 
risk imposition which is far too restrictive. Or so the argument goes. 
But that is a poor argument. Once we see what a theory of rights 
should say about the permissibility of rights infringements, we will see 
that the Risk Thesis gives the right answers about the permissibility 
of risk impositions. 
The simplest reason for rejecting the Risk Thesis comes from the 
idea that rights are absolute. On that view, if someone has the right 
that others not bring about p, then it is impermissible for others to 
bring about p. If rights are absolute, then the Risk Thesis is false since 
many risk impositions are permissible. 
The idea that rights are absolute is, however, quite problematic. 
Suppose you are away on vacation and I suddenly and unexpectedly 
need a small amount of the drug you have plenty of to save my life. 
It is quite clearly permissible for me to take that amount of the drug, 
despite your having the right that I not take it (you own it). But we 
cannot then maintain that your right that I not take it is absolute. 
3. Judith Thomson has offered a series of arguments that the Risk Thesis is false; 
see Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 
pp. 242-47, and "Some Questions about Government Regulation of Behavior," in her 
Rights, Restitution, and Risk (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 
154-72. In the passage referred to in The Realm of Rights, I think she regards risk 
imposition as not something a theory of rights has to explain-see in particular the 
last paragraph on p. 245-so I am tentatively inclined to place her among those who 
are pessimistic about a good theory of rights being able to accommodate the morality 
of risk imposition, although she thinks considerations of risk have an important role 
elsewhere in the theory of rights: see the discussion of the Trolley problem in chap. 
7. McKerlie also thinks the Risk Thesis is false; see McKerlie. Samuel Scheffler thinks 
its truth is unclear; see Scheffler, "The Role of Consent in the Legitimation of Risky 
Activities," in Gibson, ed., pp. 75-88. 
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Someone who wants to hold onto the view that rights are absolute 
has two options. One is that you only have the right that I not imper- 
missibly take the drug. But then there is no explanation of when I 
may or may not take your drug by appeal to the rights you have in 
the drug: one might as well just say that it is permissible for me to 
take the drug when and only when it is permissible. A theory of rights 
with as little explanatory power as that must be rejected out of hand. 
A second possibility is to say that you have the right that I not take 
the drug except when such and such is the case, where "such and 
such" is some illuminating description of the conditions in which it is 
permissible for me to take it. But Thomson points out that in cases 
like the one described, having taken the drug I would be under a duty 
to compensate you for it, a duty I would not have had if you had not 
had property rights in the drug when I took it.4 So she suggests that we 
see this duty to compensate as arising out of the rights infringement. A 
theory of rights in which there is a strong connection between rights 
infringements and later duties to compensate will therefore be able 
to explain why I am under a duty to compensate you for the drug, 
provided it allows that my taking the drug was a rights infringement, 
and thus allows that there can be permissible rights infringements or, 
equivalently, that rights are not absolute. 
The explanatory power of a theory of rights in which rights are 
not absolute will not, however, be that great unless we can say some- 
thing informative about when rights infringements are permissible. 
What made my taking your drug permissible surely had a lot to do 
with the fact that I needed it to save my life. If my taking it would 
have only given me a little pleasure, like drinking a glass of wine, it 
would not have been permissible for me to take it. So the good that 
results from a rights infringement has a lot to do with whether it is 
permissible. But it cannot be the only factor: if you had needed the 
drug to save your life, then it would not have been permissible for 
me to take it. So the greater the burden to the bearer of a right, the 
greater the resulting good has to be for the infringement of the right 
to be permissible. (This is consistent with some burdens being so great 
that no amount of good would make the infringement of the right 
permissible.) Thomson's second idea then, the Trade-off Idea, is that 
whether a rights infringement is permissible depends on both the good 
that would come from the infringement and the degree to which the 
4. See Thomson's "Self-Defense and Rights," "Some Ruminations on Rights," 
"Rights and Compensation," and "Some Questions about Government Regulation of 
Behavior," pp. 33-48, 49-65, 66-77, and 154-72, respectively, all reprinted in her 
Rights, Restitution, and Risk. See also Joel Feinberg, "Voluntary Euthanasia and the 
Inalienable Right to Life," Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (1978): 93-123; and Nozick, 
chap. 4. 
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bearer of the right would be made worse off by the infringement.5 At 
least roughly, a rights infringement is permissible if the good that 
would come of the infringement sufficiently outweighs the burden of 
the infringement to the bearer of the right. 
There is a lot of work to be done here. We would like to know 
how the role of consent in legitimating rights infringements connects 
with the Trade-off Idea. We would also like to know more about the 
connection between rights infringements and later duties to compen- 
sate. We will look at these issues later. And we would like to know 
when the resulting good is sufficient to make an infringement of a 
right permissible. At the very least, it is sufficient only if it is greater 
(probably much greater) than the burden to the bearer of the right, 
perhaps also only if there is at least one person whose benefit is greater 
than the burden.6 And the avoidance of harm might count more than 
other kinds of goods. 
I cannot begin to say what a complete theory of rights should say 
about all this. But my concern is only to show that we should reject 
the idea that rights are absolute. Even if answers to the remaining 
questions quickly become only matters of intuition, the theory of rights 
we get by accepting Thomson's two ideas has far greater explanatory 
power than the theory built around the idea that rights are absolute. 
That is enough to reject the claim that rights are absolute and enough 
to answer the objection, on the basis of that claim, to the Risk Thesis. 
III 
If rights are absolute, the Risk Thesis is false. But showing that rights 
are not absolute hardly shows we have a good reason to accept the 
Risk Thesis. Before we can claim that, we need to see what the Risk 
Thesis says about the permissibility of risk impositions. 
Let us suppose we understand well enough the general idea of 
when the good that would result from a rights infringement suffi- 
ciently outweighs the burden to the rights bearer to make infringing 
his or her rights permissible. To see what the Risk Thesis entails 
we need an account of how someone is burdened by bearing a risk 
of harm. 
An idea familiar from decision theory is that we can measure the 
degree to which one would be made worse off by bearing a risk of 
harm by using an appropriate measure of the harm and discounting 
it by its probability. The measure of the degree to which one has been 
made worse off by bearing risks of a number of different harms is 
given by the sum of measures of each distinct harm risked discounted 
by its probability. 
5. In particular, see Thomson, The Realm of Rights, chap. 6. 
6. Ibid., p. 166. 
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To illustrate, suppose we have an appropriate measure of harms. 
Then, imposing a risk of a ten-unit harm with a probability of 0.1 on 
someone makes her as badly off in the relevant sense (prospectively 
worse off) as imposing on her a risk of a 1 00-unit harm with a probabil- 
ity of 0.01 and as badly off as imposing on her a one-unit harm with 
a probability of one. And imposing a risk of a ten-unit harm with a 
probability of 0.1 and a twenty-unit harm with a probability of 0.1 on 
someone, where she cannot suffer both harms, is equivalent to impos- 
ing a risk of a thirty-unit harm with a probability of 0.1 on her. 
When we combine this with the rough idea that a rights infringe- 
ment is permissible if and only if the resultant good sufficiently out- 
weighs the burden to the bearer of the right, we can see that the Risk 
Thesis gives us a good account of the permissibility of risk impositions. 
Low-level risk impositions, such as those associated with many of our 
day-to-day activities, will require very little good to make them permis- 
sible, and the leisure or productive benefits of most of those activities 
will be sufficient to make them permissible. Higher-level risk imposi- 
tions, such as those associated with speeding, will not normally result 
in enough good to be permissible, although they may be permissible 
in some circumstances, like getting a critically injured person to the 
hospital. Still higher-level risk impositions, such as exposing someone 
to high levels of radiation, will be so great that in normal circumstances 
(i.e., self-defense and the like aside) no amount of good will make 
them permissible. 
In short, we should accept that there is a sliding scale of the good, 
varying with the severity of the infringement, needed to make a rights 
infringement permissible. Once we accept this, incorporating the Risk 
Thesis into our theory of rights enables that theory to explain a wide 
range of facts about the permissibility of risk impositions. But before 
concluding that this gives us a good reason to accept the Risk Thesis, 
we need to address two objections. 
The first is that some judgments look resistant to this kind of 
explanation. Each Sunday morning I go for a drive in the country just 
for pleasure and thereby impose a one in a million risk of death on 
Jones, who lives near the road. That is clearly permissible. But suppose 
that I were to get an equal amount of pleasure from playing Russian 
roulette on Jones, with a bullet in one of a million chambers.7 Many 
people would find that impermissible. But Jones would be made worse 
off to the same degree in each case, and the good that would result 
is the same in each case. This example therefore seems to contradict 
the claim that the permissibility of a rights infringement is a function 
of only the severity of the infringement and the good that would result. 
7. This example is discussed in Nozick, p. 82, and Thomson, "Some Questions 
about Government Regulation of Behavior," p. 167. 
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In response, anyone who has similar intuitions is most likely being 
moved by the idea that the structure of an agent's intentions is relevant 
to the permissibility of her actions. On one familiar account, when an 
agent knows that an action will bring about an outcome that is in some 
sense bad for another, it can make a difference whether she intends 
that bad outcome to occur (it is part of her reason for performing the 
action) or whether she merely foresees that it will occur (it is not part 
of her reason for performing the action). Intending the bad outcome 
makes the corresponding action harder to justify. 
But if this sort of idea is correct, it can easily be factored into a 
theory of rights. The idea that an infringement of a right is permissible 
if and only if the good that would result sufficiently outweighs the 
burden to the bearer of the right was only a rough idea, and there is 
plenty of room for refinement. To handle the present case we could 
make the permissibility of an agent's infringing a right a function not 
only of the severity of the infringement and the good that would result 
but also of the structure of the agent's intentions; taking into account, 
for example, the difference between intention and mere foresight. 
The example therefore does not threaten the claim that the Risk 
Thesis can explain which risk impositions are permissible. 
The second objection to the Risk Thesis is that it entails that there 
can be rights infringements which seem morally insignificant. Driving 
by someone and thereby imposing, say, a one in ten million risk of 
death on her seems to be an action of little moral significance, yet it 
would count as a rights infringement on the view we are exploring. 
That may seem counterintuitive. On Thomson's view, for example, 
this is something we might well prefer that a theory of rights avoid 
saying, and she takes this to be good reason to reject the Risk Thesis.8 
Even if this objection is sound, it does not obviously follow that 
a theory of rights cannot accommodate risk impositions. We might 
instead, as Thomson suggests (but goes on to reject), adopt the High- 
Risk Thesis: we have the right that others not impose high risks of 
harm upon us, but not the right that others not impose nonhigh risks 
of harm upon us. 
There are, however, several difficulties with the High-Risk Thesis. 
It is far from obvious where, or even how, to draw the line between 
high and nonhigh risks. Now, in the theory of rights sketched here a 
lot is being left to intuition, as in, for example, the question of how much 
good (if any) would make a particular rights infringement permissible. 
So we should not overstate the force of the objection that where we draw 
the line is being left merely to intuition. But a more serious difficulty is 
8. See Thomson, The Realm of Rights, p. 245, where she also makes the suggestion 
of the following paragraph. 
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that it is far from obvious why we would even want a line at all. We have 
seen that by allowing that there is a sliding scale of the good that is 
needed to make a rights infringement permissible, with, in particular, 
relatively little good needed to make permissible infringements which 
hardly make the bearer of the right any worse off at all, we can account 
for our understanding of the permissibility of a very wide range of risk 
impositions. It is therefore far from obvious that the distinction between 
high and nonhigh risks is doing any work at all, and we would do well 
not to clutter up our theory of rights with distinctions with no explanatory 
power. It may even be that our feeling that there should be no such 
things as trivial rights infringements is merely a vestige of the mistaken 
but compelling view that rights are absolute. 
If we accept that the structure of an agent's intentions is relevant 
to the permissibility of her infringing the rights of others, we may 
have another reason to reject the High-Risk Thesis. The example we 
used of the possible relevance of the agent's intentions involved the 
distinction between his intending and merely foreseeing that one of 
his actions would cause some sort of bad outcome for another agent. 
But clearly we need to say what kinds of bad outcomes are relevant 
here. Now, it is noteworthy that the usual examples that are used to 
illustrate this kind of doctrine are rights infringements, and so it is at 
least plausible that the bad outcomes in question are just those that 
we have rights that others not bring about.9 For the sake of argument, 
assume that a one in a hundred thousand risk of death is high, while 
a one in a million risk of death is not. If the High-Risk Thesis were 
true, then my playing Russian roulette on Jones with one bullet in a 
gun with a million chambers would not count as a rights infringement. 
Hence, it would not fall within the scope of the relevance of the 
distinction between intention and mere foresight, so we could not 
appeal to our theory of rights to explain why it is impermissible, as 
we could if the Risk Thesis were true. 
A further kind of reason to reject the High-Risk Thesis lies in 
acts which simultaneously infringe the rights of many agents. Smith 
has a noxious chemical he wishes to get rid of.'0 There is a perfectly 
safe way of disposing of it, but it is rather expensive. So he considers 
two alternatives, dumping it in the nearby pond or pouring it into the 
river. If he dumps it in the pond, his neighbor Bloggs will thereby 
9. As suggested in Warren Quinn, "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The 
Doctrine of Double Effect," in his Morality and Action, ed. Philippa Foot (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 175-93, p. 188. 
10. This example is based on one discussed in McKerlie, although my conclusions 
are different from his. Railton also suggests that similar examples are difficult for a 
theory of rights to handle, but as the text will make clear, I disagree. 
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bear a one in a hundred thousand risk of death. If he pours it in the 
river, a million people will bear a one in a million risk of death. 
We were assuming that a one in a hundred thousand risk of death 
is high. So if the High-Risk Thesis is correct, then Smith's dumping 
the chemical in the pond would be a rights infringement. Furthermore, 
let us also suppose that the resultant good would not be great enough 
for it to be permissible (it is not that expensive to dispose of it safely). 
Now my intuition is that if imposing a one in a hundred thousand 
risk of death on one person for a given benefit is impermissible, then 
so is imposing a one in a million risk of death on a million people for 
the same benefit. Assuming that this kind of intuition is correct, we 
might ask how a theory of rights could explain it, for it is exactly the 
kind of intuition which a theory of rights should explain. The most 
natural explanation is that the rights of each of the million somehow 
aggregate to form a stronger moral constraint. But we were also assum- 
ing that a one in a million risk of death is not high. So if the High- 
Risk Thesis is correct, then Smith's pouring the chemical in the river 
would not infringe anyone's rights, so there would be no rights to 
aggregate. It would therefore seem easier for a theory of rights to 
explain this kind of intuition if we allow that the act in question would 
infringe the rights of each of the million, and this gives us reason to 
prefer the Risk Thesis to the High-Risk Thesis. Now, the whole topic 
of aggregation within the theory of rights, and, more generally, within 
nonconsequentialist moral theory, is notoriously unclear, and so this 
kind of example cannot be seen as decisive support for that conclusion. 
But in the absence of a complete theory of aggregation, it seems more 
natural, at least provisionally, to accept that rights can aggregate and 
to prefer the Risk Thesis. 
Since there are several reasons to prefer the Risk Thesis, we 
should perhaps ask what exactly is wrong with a theory of rights that 
allows that there can be trivial rights infringements. One reason is 
that it would give the wrong answers about permissibility. But we have 
already seen that it need not once we accept, as we should, that there 
is a sliding scale of the good needed to make a rights infringement 
permissible, depending, largely, on the degree of severity of the in- 
fringement. In fact, the only difficulty I can think of lies in a worry 
about the proliferation of rights: if we allow that there can be trivial 
rights infringements, then our respect for rights will diminish. But I 
am far from sure that this is a good objection, at least in the case in 
question. First, I suspect that we do not take risk impositions as seri- 
ously as we should, and this includes simultaneous impositions of very 
small risks on very large numbers of people. If we were to accept the 
Risk Thesis, then we might well end up treating risk impositions with 
more like the appropriate degree of seriousness. (One might even 
suspect that it is the fanatical combination of the proliferation of rights 
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and the view that they are absolute that in fact seems to occur in public 
debate that leads to their cheapening and that more modesty in the 
way we talk about rights would lead to greater respect for rights.) 
Second, I stressed earlier that the construction of a theory of rights is 
what I have been calling a philosophical inquiry. If, as I think we 
should, we incorporate the Risk Thesis into our theory of rights, it 
does not follow that the best, or even a good, way of engaging in what 
I called moral disagreement about rights would be to talk in terms of 
the Risk Thesis. And it is public discussion, not philosophical inquiry, 
that would have an effect on our respect for rights. On balance, the 
one objection I can see to the idea that there can be trivial rights 
infringements is at best moot, while there are several good reasons to 
prefer the Risk Thesis to the High-Risk Thesis. 
Incorporating the Risk Thesis into our theory of rights enables 
that theory to give a good explanation of a wide range of facts about 
the permissibility of risk impositions. The objections to this form of 
explanation can be answered, so this gives us a good reason to accept 
the Risk Thesis. Yet, it does not give us a decisive reason. Accepting 
the Risk Thesis has ramifications for other parts of the morality of 
risk imposition aside from the permissibility of risk impositions, and 
to these we must turn. 
IV 
Consent is one of the most important notions within the realm of 
rights, and it is clearly relevant to the permissibility of many risk- 
imposing activities: consider exposing someone to radiation as part of 
an experiment. A plausible general feature of rights is the Consent 
Idea: if an agent has the right that others not bring about p, then it 
is permissible for others to bring about p if the agent consents. So 
accepting the Risk Thesis would enable us to explain why it would be 
permissible to expose someone to radiation if she consented. 
But the more important thing to be explained is that it would not 
be permissible if she did not consent. We saw the plausibility of the 
Trade-off Idea earlier, and that entailed the following: if an agent has 
the right that others not bring about p, then it is permissible for others 
to bring about p if the good that would come of bringing about p 
would sufficiently outweigh the burden to the bearer of the right. So 
it is natural to say that if an agent has the right that others not bring 
about p, then, self-defense and the like aside, it is impermissible for 
others to bring about p unless it is made permissible either by the 
Consent Idea or by the Trade-off Idea. Since the Trade-off Idea would 
not legitimate the radiation exposure, accepting the Risk Thesis would 
explain why it would be impermissible unless the agent consented. 
But this cannot be the whole story. It seems plausible that even 
if the Trade-off Idea makes permissible an infringement of a right, 
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then, other things being equal, the potential infringer of the right 
ought to seek (but not necessarily obtain) the consent of the holder 
of the right first. And this may seem to make trouble for the Risk 
Thesis because there are a great many risk impositions for which it is 
not true that one ought to seek consent first. 
The answer lies in the "other things being equal" clause. If the 
Trade-off Idea makes permissible an infringement of a right, it is 
permissible for the about-to-be infringer of the right not to seek con- 
sent if seeking it would be unduly onerous. In the example where I 
needed your drug but you were away on vacation, it would have been 
very hard to get hold of you, so it was not the case that I ought to 
have sought your consent. In fact, two features of risk impositions 
often make seeing consent difficult. First, it is often hard to know who 
the potential risk bearers are. Second, many risk-imposing activities 
impose very small risks on very large numbers of people, and the more 
people, the harder it is to seek consent from all of them. So if we 
accept the Risk Thesis, we can use the general structure of our theory 
of rights to explain why consent is necessary for some risk impositions 
to be permissible, why the potential risk imposer ought to seek consent 
for still more risk impositions, and why it is not the case that she ought 
to seek consent for other risk impositions. This gives us a reason to 
accept the Risk Thesis. 
Another aspect of the morality of risk imposition is that it is some- 
times permissible to use force in self-defense to prevent someone from 
imposing certain risks on you. And, provided certain procedural con- 
straints are met, government can permissibly punish people for impos- 
ing certain risks on others. What I am going to say about self-defense 
applies almost unchanged to punishment, so to save space I will discuss 
only self-defense. 
Self-defense is complicated in two ways. First, the amount of force 
you may use is subject to a proportionality constraint: it cannot be too 
great in relation to the magnitude of the risk imposed. Second, you 
may use force in self-defense only to prevent certain kinds of risk 
impositions, not, for example, to prevent the risk your neighbor im- 
poses on you each time he turns on his gas stove. So which risk imposi- 
tions may you use force in self-defense to prevent? A natural sugges- 
tion is that it is the risk impositions which are impermissible. 
While that is along the right lines, there is something missing. 
One may not use force in self-defense to prevent just any kind of 
impermissible behavior. There are many occasions on which people 
really ought not to be impolite, but this does not make it permissible 
to use force to prevent them. What we need is a way of carving out 
the kinds of impermissible actions to which self-defense is a permissible 
response. We have a clue from the earlier idea that if the structure of 
an agent's intentions is relevant to the permissibility of actions which 
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produce certain kinds of bad outcomes, then the kinds of bad outcomes 
that are relevant are rights infringements. So I suggest that the kinds 
of impermissible actions which make self-defense permissible are im- 
permissible rights infringements. More generally, I suggest that a plau- 
sible theory of rights will contain something like the following. If an 
agent has the right that others not bring about p, then it is permissible 
for others to bring about p if that is necessary to prevent the agent 
from impermissibly infringing the rights of others, subject to a propor- 
tionality constraint. So a plausible theory of rights can explain why it 
is permissible to harm someone to prevent her from impermissibly 
imposing a risk of harm on another, subject to a proportionality con- 
straint, provided that her imposing such a risk is a rights infringement. 
Thus, considerations of self-defense and punishment, like considera- 
tions of consent, give us a good reason to accept the Risk Thesis. 
V 
I now want to turn to compensation, but it will help first to make 
explicit something I have been assuming all along. In discussing the 
permissibility of impositions of risks of harm and their relation to the 
Risk Thesis, I have been assuming that insofar as the consequences 
of an agent's act are relevant to its permissibility, it is the expected 
consequences that matter, not the actual consequences. Suppose two 
actions impose a risk of the same magnitude, but one happens to cause 
a harm while the other does not. If everything else about the actions 
is the same, then, on this assumption, they were either both permissible 
or both impermissible. 
There is an alternative view. This says that insofar as the conse- 
quences of an agent's act are relevant to its permissibility, it is the 
actual consequences that matter, not the expected consequences. So 
in the example just given, one action might have been permissible 
while the other was impermissible because of the difference in their 
actual consequences. 
The issues lurking beneath the surface here are surprisingly com- 
plex. I have argued elsewhere that the assumption I have been making 
is correct, but there is a lot to be said for the other view, so I am going 
to have to bypass this issue.11 I will continue to assume, and I hope 
you will follow me, that insofar as the consequences of an agent's 
actions are relevant to their permissibility, it is the expected conse- 
quences that are relevant, not the actual consequences. There is one 
caveat: this assumption does not mean that whether a risk imposition 
11. See David McCarthy, "Actions, Beliefs, and Consequences," Philosophical Stud- 
ies, in press. While not endorsing it, Thomson cautiously suggests it is very hard to see 
what is wrong with the other view; see Thomson, "Imposing Risks," in Rights, Restitution, 
and Risk, pp. 173-91. 
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happens to cause harm or not has no bearing on issues of compensa- 
tion and punishment. It does, and why this is so will come out in what 
follows. I turn first to compensation. 
Recall the example in which I took some of your drug to save my 
life. I infringed one of your rights, and although the infringement 
was permissible, I was then under a duty to compensate you. That 
suggested a strong connection between rights infringements (permissi- 
ble or not) and duties to compensate. 
Suppose I impose a risk of harm on someone. Then, from the 
point of view of questions to do with permissibility, my action is equiva- 
lent to an action which imposes a different risk, but one of the same 
magnitude, and which is identical in all other respects apart from, 
possibly, the actual consequences. In particular, my action is equivalent 
to an otherwise identical risk imposing action where the relevant prob- 
ability is one but the harm is equal in magnitude to the risk of harm 
my action imposes. In other words, my risk imposition is, from the 
point of view of questions to do with permissibility, equivalent to an 
action which is certain to make someone suffer a smaller harm. Since 
a strong connection holds between actions which are certain to harm 
someone and later duties to compensate, and since, from the point of 
view of questions to do with permissibility, the two actions are equiva- 
lent, there is a strong case for saying that risk impositions give rise to 
duties to compensate which are in some way parallel. A theory of 
rights will be able to explain this by appeal to the strong connection 
between rights infringements and later duties to compensate if the 
Risk Thesis is true. Hence, considerations of compensation appear to 
support the Risk Thesis. 
This is only a gesture toward an argument. To make it firmer, 
we need to be clear on two things. First, we need to ask what this 
strong connection between rights infringements and later duties to 
compensate is. Second, given an answer to that, we need to see whether 
it generates a plausible theory of compensation if we adopt the Risk 
Thesis. 
The examples usually used to establish the connection between 
rights infringements and later duties to compensate are quite special. 
They involve intentional, broadly self-interested, uncoerced rights in- 
fringements performed in conditions of full information. And it is 
clear that the duties they give rise to are quite ordinary duties for the 
infringer of a right to compensate the bearer of the right. 
But are the duties that arise from all rights infringements so clear? 
It is far from obvious that there cannot be rights infringements which 
are unintentional, altruistic, coerced, or performed in conditions of 
incomplete information, and in many of these cases our intuitions 
about compensation are quite murky. And the form of the duties 
which arise out of such rights infringements and which are connected 
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with compensation is not always obvious. Thus, I suggest that we say 
that other things being equal, if one person infringes the right of 
another, then, very roughly, the infringer is under a duty to compen- 
sate the bearer of the right. Call this the Compensation Idea. This is 
somewhat vague, but we may welcome that. The most important cases 
for a theory of compensation are those in which one person is harmed 
as a result of another's imposing a risk of harm on him or her, and 
we do well to leave some flexibility in what we say about such cases. 
It will appear that the Compensation Idea makes the Risk Thesis 
look implausible. In almost every case in which one person is under 
a duty to compensate another, the first actually caused the second to 
be harmed. There are few cases in which one person is under a duty 
to compensate another without having caused that person to be 
harmed,12 and at most very few cases in which one person is under a 
duty to compensate another merely for having imposed a risk of harm 
on that person without that person's having been harmed at all.13 
Thus, given the Compensation Idea, accepting the Risk Thesis seems 
to lead to counterintuitive results.14 
One response to this objection is to appeal to the "other things 
being equal" clause in the Compensation Idea to explain why risk 
impositions do not always lead to duties to compensate. But that clause 
mostly gestures toward cases in which the infringer of a right was 
ignorant, and reasonably so, of the fact that his or her action would 
be infringing a right. But the objection could be made about actions 
which the risk imposer knows will impose a risk of harm on someone 
else: they often do not lead to a duty to compensate the risk bearer, 
so in the discussion that follows, I will assume that the "other things 
being equal" clause makes no difference. 
In responding to the objection, we do better to focus on the "very 
roughly" part of the Compensation Idea. To see why, we must ask 
what would compensate someone for bearing a risk. We are assuming 
that insofar as the consequences of an agent's actions are relevant to 
their permissibility, it is the expected consequences that matter, not 
the actual consequences. This means that the morally relevant sense 
in which agents are made worse off by bearing risks is that they bear 
an expected harm or are made prospectively worse off. An agent 
12. For a discussion of such cases, see Thomson, "Remarks on Causation and 
Liability," in Rights, Restitution, and Risk, pp. 192-224. 
13. But there are, I believe, some cases like this. I also believe that these cases and 
the cases referred to in the previous note support the general claim I am advancing in 
this section, that duties to compensate are very closely linked to risk impositions. See 
David McCarthy, "Liability and Risk," Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (1996): 238-63. 
14. Thomson takes this to be a good reason to reject the Risk Thesis. See Thomson, 
"Some Questions about Government Regulation of Behavior." 
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would therefore be compensated for bearing a risk if she were to 
receive some benefit that made her, on balance, prospectively as well 
off as she would have been had she neither received the benefit nor 
borne the risk. 
One way in which you can be compensated for bearing a risk is 
by receiving a direct payment. For example, if you are what is known 
as risk neutral with respect to money, then receiving ten dollars would 
make you as prospectively well off for bearing a one in ten risk of (a 
harm equivalent to) a hundred-dollar loss as you would have been 
had you neither borne the risk nor received the ten dollars. In other 
words, receiving the ten dollars would compensate you for bearing 
the risk. 
But there is another way in which you can be compensated for 
bearing a risk. Suppose that as a result of bearing a risk of harm, you 
receive a guarantee to be compensated for the harm if you suffer the 
harm as a result of bearing the risk, and nothing otherwise. This 
compensates you for bearing the risk. For, two things can happen: 
either you do not suffer the harm as a result of bearing the risk or 
you do suffer it as a result of bearing the risk but are fully compensated 
for suffering it. So the guarantee means that in each case you are no 
worse off for having borne the risk. Thus, you are prospectively no 
worse off for bearing the risk and receiving the guarantee than you 
would have been had you neither borne the risk nor received the 
guarantee. Hence, receiving the guarantee fully compensates you for 
bearing the risk. 
This needs to be qualified in one way. Suppose that in one case 
I impose a risk of harm on you without your knowing about it, while 
in the other I impose the same risk on you, but you are aware of it 
and suffer fear as a result. If the prospective value of the compensation 
you will receive in either case is the same, then if that fully compensates 
you for bearing the first risk, it would seem that it does not fully 
compensate you for bearing the second risk because of the addi- 
tional fear. 
Fear raises many puzzling questions. For example, there is the 
question about when to count it as a kind of harm, and there are 
questions about what Nozick once called "free-floating fears.""5 These 
give rise to difficult problems for any theory of compensation, but I 
do not think they raise any particular difficulties for the theory I will 
be arguing for. For example, if we regard fear as a kind of harm, then 
we could treat causing fear and the duties to compensate that it gives 
rise to separately. Or we probably do better, for the kinds of reasons 
that will emerge, to base our account of the duties to compensate that 
15. See Nozick, pp. 65-69. 
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arise from risk impositions which cause fear on the following idea. If 
you are guaranteed to receive an appropriate amount in excess of 
compensation for the harm if you are harmed, and nothing otherwise, 
then the prospective value of this guarantee fully compensates you 
for bearing the risk of harm and suffering the fear that it causes.16 
But developing these ideas would take us away from our main task, 
so for simplicity I will ignore fear in what follows. 
Consider two rules. First, the Direct Payment Rule: if an agent 
imposes a risk of harm on another, then he or she is under a duty to 
compensate the risk bearer by making a direct payment. Second, the 
Natural Lottery Rule: if an agent imposes a risk of harm on another, 
then he or she is under a duty to pay the risk bearer compensation 
for the harm if the risk bearer suffers the harm as a result of bearing 
the risk, and nothing otherwise. These rules have this in common. 
Suppose an agent imposes a risk of harm on someone, and one of the 
rules applies. If the agent is guaranteed to comply with whatever 
duties arise from that rule, then the risk bearer is fully compensated 
for bearing the risk. (Of course, the agent can fail to comply with 
whatever duties arise from the Natural Lottery Rule, but the agent 
can also fail to comply with the duties that arise from the Direct 
Payment Rule.) Hence, a theory of rights which contains the Risk 
Thesis, and which says that the Natural Lottery Rule applies to all risk 
impositions, satisfies the requirement the Compensation Idea gestures 
toward. Indeed, we can now state the Compensation Idea more pre- 
cisely: other things being equal, if an agent infringes someone's right, 
then the agent is subject to a rule such that if the agent is guaranteed 
to comply with whatever duties arise from that rule, then the bearer 
of the right is fully compensated for the infringement. 
Some will find it implausible to claim that, given the Risk Thesis, 
the Natural Lottery Rule satisfies the intuitive requirement behind the 
Compensation Idea. But I see no reason to reject that claim once we 
accept that what is morally significant about risk impositions is the 
magnitude of the risk imposed. That magnitude has to be understood 
in terms of prospective, or expected, value, but the expected value to 
the risk bearer, given that risk imposers will comply with whatever 
rules apply, is the same and is compensation for the risk under both 
the Direct Payment Rule and the Natural Lottery Rule. Hence, if the 
Risk Thesis is true, the Natural Lottery Rule meets the requirement 
behind the Compensation Idea to the full extent that the Direct Pay- 
ment Rule does. 
16. I believe this kind of factoring idea can also be used to answer the worry Nozick 
raised about compensation and the fair division of the benefits of exchange. Ibid., 
pp. 63-65. 
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Suppose a theory of rights contains the Risk Thesis. That theory 
is consistent with the Compensation Idea if the Natural Lottery Rule 
applies to all risk impositions, if the Direct Payment Rule applies to 
all, or if the Natural Lottery Rule applies to some and the Direct 
Payment Rule to others. So, there is more work to be done if we want 
to uncover the theory of compensation that results from adopting the 
Risk Thesis. 
Two facts help us to do this. First, risk imposers are certainly 
not guaranteed to comply with whatever duties arise from their risk 
impositions. Second, even if they do comply, compliance has costs. 
This means, at least roughly, that it is to advantage of both risk im- 
posers and risk bearers that the rule which applies to a particular kind 
of risk imposition is the rule which is easiest to comply (and to enforce 
compliance) with. For that means that the value to the risk bearers of 
the rule which applies comes as close as possible to full compensation 
for bearing the risk, while the costs for risk imposers of engaging in 
valued productive and leisure activities are as low as possible consistent 
with, very roughly, their being under a duty to compensate those on 
whom they impose risks. 
In terms of ease of compliance, the Natural Lottery Rule enjoys 
three great advantages over the Direct Payment Rule. First, consider 
the number of times each puts the risk imposer under a duty to depart 
from the status quo. The Direct Payment Rule does this each time 
someone imposes a risk, but the Natural Lottery Rule only does this 
when someone has been harmed as a result of bearing a risk. For a 
one in ten thousand risk of harm, for example, the Direct Payment 
Rule will put the risk imposer under a duty to depart from the status 
quo ten thousand times more often in the long run than the Natural 
Lottery Rule. Since the transaction costs associated with such depar- 
tures are significant, this is a great advantage of the Natural Lottery 
Rule. Second, the two rules give rise to different information costs. 
This happens in two ways. (1) To know what the Direct Payment Rule 
requires, one needs to know who has imposed a risk on whom, whereas 
to know what the Natural Lottery Rule requires, one merely needs to 
know who has caused whom to be harmed. And it is clearly easier to 
identify someone who has been harmed (and who caused it) than 
someone who has merely borne a risk of harm (and who imposed it). 
(2) To know what the Direct Payment Rule requires, one also needs 
to know the magnitude of the risk. But it is notoriously difficult to 
determine the relevant probabilities which determine this magnitude. 
But a truly delightful feature of the Natural Lottery Rule is that one 
does not need to know this: one knows in advance that if someone 
imposes a risk of harm on another and will compensate the risk bearer 
for any harm that results from the risk imposition, then the risk bearer 
is compensated for bearing the risk no matter what the probability 
was of the harm resulting from the risk imposition. 
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These advantages the Natural Lottery Rule enjoys over the Direct 
Payment Rule are enormous. While there are other considerations, 
this illustrates why if we accept both the Risk Thesis and the Compen- 
sation Idea, then the Natural Lottery Rule is the rule which governs 
most risk impositions. Thus, contrary to the objection made earlier, 
given that we accept the Compensation Idea, it does not follow that 
if we accept the Risk Thesis we are committed to counterintuitive 
claims about compensation. Moreover, by accepting the Risk The- 
sis-an idea which explains so much else connected with risk imposi- 
tion-we provide a foundation for the common intuition that in a 
large number of cases, if one person causes another to be harmed, 
then the first is under a duty to compensate the second for the harm. 
This gives us a further reason to accept the Risk Thesis. 
I have argued elsewhere that, independent of any position on 
rights, we ought to see risk imposition as what lies at the heart of the 
theory of compensation, more or less along the lines sketched here.17 
If that is correct, we can draw two corollaries about rights. First, it 
shows that not only does the Risk Thesis not yield counterintuitive 
claims about compensation, but it also provides a good way of fitting 
the best theory of compensation into the theory of rights. Second, it 
provides a further reason to prefer the Risk Thesis to the High-Risk 
Thesis. There are cases in which one person imposes a very small risk 
of harm on another but is under a duty to compensate the other for 
the harm if she suffers the harm as a result.18 It is hard to explain 
this if we accept the High-Risk Thesis, but straightforward if we accept 
the Risk Thesis. 
The reasons why the Natural Lottery Rule applies to most risk 
impositions if we accept the Risk Thesis carry over to punishment. 
We are used to thinking that a successful attempt at a certain crime 
should be punished more severely than a failed but otherwise identical 
attempt at the same crime. But it is not so obvious how to justify this 
when the difference between success and failure is purely a matter of 
luck, because it seems natural to treat equally serious attempts at the 
same crime equally. But we can do that if the expected punishment 
we impose on equally serious attempts is the same. And it is natural 
to treat more serious attempts at a crime more severely than less serious 
attempts at the same crime. And we can do that if the expected punish- 
ment we impose upon the former is greater than the expected punish- 
ment we impose on the latter. But we, can do both by punishing 
attempts at a certain crime with the Natural Lottery Punishment: mild 
punishment if the attempt fails, severe punishment if the attempt 
succeeds. And many of the reasons for preferring the Natural Lottery 
17. See McCarthy, "Liability and Risk." 
18. Ibid. 
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Rule over the Direct Payment Rule in the context of compensation 
are also reasons for preferring the Natural Punishment Rule to the 
Direct Punishment Rule, where the punishment is in proportion to 
the seriousness of the attempt.19 
I want to end this discussion of compensation by considering 
a second objection to the whole account of the connection between 
compensation and rights offered here. I began this article by saying 
that any plausible theory of rights will assign to us something at least 
very much like the right that others not harm us. Call the claim that 
we have exactly that right the Harm Thesis, and suppose it is correct. 
Suppose I impose a risk of harm on you, and this causes you to be 
harmed. I have thereby infringed your right that I not impose a risk 
of harm on you, and I have also infringed your right that I not harm 
you. If the account of compensation I have just sketched is correct, 
that would seem to entail that I am now under a duty to compensate 
you twice for the harm: once because of the Harm Thesis and once 
because of the Risk Thesis. That would be an absurd result. I reply 
that the only right that you have connected with your being harmed 
is that ascribed by the Risk Thesis; insofar as the Harm Thesis ascribes 
to you a distinct right, it is a right you do not have; hence, I am not 
under a duty to compensate you twice. 
This may seem counterintuitive, but it is not. It would be if your 
not having that right meant, say, that it is permissible for me to know- 
ingly harm you but not to knowingly impose a risk of that harm on 
you. But it does not mean that. If I knowingly harm you, then I 
knowingly impose a risk of that harm on you, the probability of that 
harm being one, so the Risk Thesis will give the correct answer about 
the permissibility of my act. Moreover, the Risk Thesis will, as I have 
argued in earlier sections, give the correct answer about the permissi- 
bility of actions in which I impose a risk of harm on you where the 
probability is less than one. In fact, there is something deeper here. 
I have been assuming all along that the permissibility of risk-imposing 
actions is a function of, in part, the magnitude of the risk imposed, 
and not what the risk imposition happens to cause. The claim that 
the Risk Thesis is correct and the Harm Thesis false insofar as it 
ascribes a right distinct from the Risk Thesis naturally reflects this 
assumption, whereas the claim that the Harm Thesis is correct and 
the Risk Thesis false naturally reflects the claim that the permissibility 
of risk imposing actions is a function, in part, of what they happen 
to cause, and not the magnitude of the risk. Since I believe that the 
assumption I have been making is correct, I am glad to have to reject 
19. This parallels the main argument in David Lewis, "The Punishment That 
Leaves Something to Chance," Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (1989): 53-67. 
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the Harm Thesis insofar as it ascribes a right not ascribed by the 
Risk Thesis. 
VI 
To say that someone has a right is a useful way of gesturing toward 
a very complex set of moral constraints and prerogatives. To those of 
us who are convinced that people have rights, that those kinds of 
constraints and prerogatives really do exist, a list of the rights we think 
people have describes some important, if rough, contours in a part of 
morality and may help us to understand what that part of morality is 
about. But, given the complexity of the kinds of moral constraints and 
prerogatives that talk of rights gestures toward, there is a great deal 
that such a list fails to reflect. Much of the interest of constructing a 
theory of rights lies in trying to get a more fine-grained description 
of those constraints and prerogatives while bringing out their internal 
structure, although this may ultimately be only a stepping stone to a 
deeper understanding of those constraints and prerogatives in which 
rights are not mentioned. 
Without being very clear on what makes a particular kind of moral 
constraint or prerogative something that a theory of rights should 
explain, it seems clear to me that the constraints and prerogatives 
related to acts which impose risks of harm on others are of that kind. 
The pessimism that many writers have expressed over whether such 
constraints and prerogatives can be accommodated within a theory of 
rights should, I think, be seen as a deeper form of pessimism, because 
it puts into doubt the viability of the whole project of constructing an 
adequate theory of rights. But I have argued that if we incorporate 
the Risk Thesis into out theory of rights and reject the Harm Thesis, 
insofar as that assigns a right not assigned by the Risk Thesis, then 
the resulting theory of rights is both simple and well motivated and 
captures a wide range of facts about the morality of risk imposi- 
tion-including the permissibility of risk impositions, consent, self- 
defense, punishment, and compensation-and reveals and explains 
their structure. Some of the ideas needed may seem counterintuitive, 
such as the idea that there can be trivial rights infringements and the 
idea that the Natural Lottery Rule is founded on a way of compensating 
someone for bearing a risk of harm, but I can see no good objection 
to them. The only reason for rejecting the Risk Thesis despite all this 
must lie in the thought that the whole project of trying to construct 
a theory of rights along the lines I have described is deeply miscon- 
ceived. But I do not see why that would be. 
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